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Installment Land Contracts:
Remedies in Nebraska
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent return to a tight money market' has caused a resur-
gence in the use of installment land sales contracts 2 to finance the
purchase of real property.3 With this resurgence, increased litiga-
tion of the rights and remedies of the parties to the contracts will
most certainly occur. At this time the law varies not only between
jurisdictions but even within a state, depending on the type of ac-
tion brought, the terms of the contract and the facts and circum-
stances of each case.4 Nebraska is not alone in lacking a clearly
defined body of law to apply to installment land contracts.5 Part of
1. Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L REV. 391, 395 (1966);
Comment, Remedying the Inequities of Forfeiture in Land Installment Con-
tracts, 64 IowA L REV. 158, 158 (1978). A tight money market is created when
the competition is keen for a limited supply of capital, thus enabling lenders
to be more selective in the terms on which they are willing to invest their
funds. The results are higher interest rates, larger down payments and larger
monthly payments. See Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble; Lender's Remedies
Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW. 1927 (1976).
2. This financing device is known by many labels: contract for deed, long-term
land contract, installment land contract, land installment contract or in some
instances just land contract. In this Comment this device will be referred to
as the installment land contract.
3. Comment, supra note 1, at 163. Since many people derive personal satisfac-
tion and economic benefits from owning property, the demand for property
does not fluctuate as significantly as does the supply of money; therefore, al-
ternative means of financing purchases must be secured when the conven-
tional means, i.e., mortgage money, are unavailable. See W. ATrEBERRY, K.
PEARsON & M. LrrA, REAL ESTATE LAw 303 (1974).
4. Power, supra note 1, at 416. 'The one thing certain for the vendor of real
property... is that his position, in regards to the forfeiture clause agreed
upon by both parties, is now even more uncertain, albeit all of the dealings
were on an equal and fair basis." Comment, Enforcement of Forfeiture Provi-
sions as a Remedy in Land Sale Contracts, 14 HASTINGS I.J. 44, 51 (1962).
"Our real quarrel with the state of the law in this area, however, is not so
much that it is unjust, but that it is uncertain." Lee, Defaulting Purchaser's
Right to Restitution Under the Installment Land Contract, 20 U. MIAMu I REV.
1, 2 (1965).
5. See Peterson, Purchase Agreements and Installment Contracts for Sale of
Real Estate, 40 NEB. I REv. 271 (1961).
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the deficiency in this area of the law is due to the paucity of litiga-
tion in recent years. Additional difficulties occur in attempting to
establish a coherent theory in an area of the law which relies heav-
ily on equity for dispute resolution.
In attempting to define the state of the law applicable to install-
ment land contracts, it is important to distinguish those financing
devices from both marketing contracts for the sale of land and
mortgages. This article will summarize the differences between
these three devices and then analyze the advantages and disad-
vantages of installment land contracts. Next it will discuss the
concept of forfeiture and liquidated damages as applied to install-
ment land contracts. It will then set out the remedies available to
the vendor under Nebraska law. Finally, the theories available to
protect the interests of the defaulting vendee will be discussed.
I. INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS, MARKETING
CONTRACTS, AND MORTGAGES
The installment land contract is a form of security transaction
between a vendor and a vendee in which the vendor covenants to
convey title6 to described real property upon the vendee's pay-
ment of a specified amount of money and successful performance
of the other obligations set forth in the contract. Typically, the re-
quired down payment is small,7 with the balance to be paid in reg-
ular installments over an extended period of time.8 The contract
usually provides for monthly or annual payments which are often
equal to the rental value of the property, and include amounts to
be applied toward taxes, insurance, interest, and the unpaid princi-
pal balance.9 Upon execution of the contract, the vendor retains
6. The contract between the parties may state specifically that the vendor is to
convey marketable title upon the satisfaction of the vendee's obligations.
The land contract vendor is required to possess marketable title only at the
time he is legally obligated to perform. Hancock, Installment Contracts for
the Purchase of Land in Nebraska, 38 NEB. I REV. 953, 953 (1959). See also
Lee, The Interests Created by the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L
REv. 367, 367 (1965). The vendee may find himself in the unfortunate position
of having completed his obligations under the contract and then not receiving
a marketable title. The vendee can protect his interests by reviewing the title
at the time he signs the contract and then recording the contract and/or re-
quiring the deed to be put in escrow. Hancock, supra, at 955. See 1 G. GLENN,
GLENN ON MORTGAGES § 15.1 (1943).
7. Lashkowitz, Land Purchase Contracts in North Dakota, 36 N.DJ. REV. 159,
159 (1960); Comment, supra note 1, at 161.
8. For a discussion of the tax advantages of an installment sale, see note 31 &
accompanying text infra.
9. Cunningham & Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions as Mort-
gages in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (1972). With equal frequency the
payments may only represent principal and interest payments, leaving the
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legal title as a security interest in the land, whereas equitable title
vests with the purchaser, who is allowed to be in possession of the
property while making payments.' 0 The contract usually stipu-
lates that "time is of the essence" and provides that upon the pur-
chaser's default in making payments or in performing any of the
other covenants, the seller may declare forfeiture, terminate all
rights of the purchaser, and retain all payments made on the con-
tract as liquidated damages."
The marketing contract' 2 is primarily a short-term pre-
purchase agreement. It establishes the rights and liabilities of the
parties between the date of the bargain and the date of closing.13
On the closing date, the contract is executed and the title passes to
the purchaser.' 4 The purchaser does not acquire a right to posses-
sion until he acquires the title. If the purchaser is unable to fully
finance the purchase, he is responsible for locating an alternate
source of financing. In contrast, the installment land contract pur-
chaser relies on the vendor for financing.
Although both the marketing contract and the installment land
contract call for a down payment, this requirement serves a differ-
ent purpose in each. In the marketing contract the parties agree to
an amount that will be paid to the seller upon execution of the buy-
sell agreement. This amount establishes, by agreement between
the parties, the liquidated damages to which the seller is entitled
should the buyer fail to fully execute the contract. In the install-
ment land contract, however, the down payment does not serve
this purpose. There the parties contemplate a long-term relation-
ship and the contract is a security device. Thus, the amount of the
vendee's down payment does not represent an agreement as to the
responsibility for paying insurance and taxes with the vendee. One commen-
tator criticized this practice as having an onerous effect on the low income
vendee who must pay insurance and taxes without having the advantage of
the escrow account set up in mortgage transactions. Mixon, Installment Land
Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transactions, With Proposals for Reform
and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in the Inner City, 7 Hous. L.
REv. 523, 529 (1970).
10. W. ATrEBERRY, K. PEARSON & M. LrrxA, supra note 3, at 303.
11. Hines, Forfeiture of Installment Land Contracts, 12 U. KAN. L R.v. 475, 476
(1964).
12. A contract entered for the sale of property is also known as a buy-sell con-
tract, a binder, an earnest money contract, a deposit receipt, or an exercised
option. In this Comment this type of contract will be referred to as a market-
ing contract. See generally J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
4 (1974).
13. See id. at 729.
14. Hetland, The California Land Contract, 48 CALF. L REV. 729, 736-42 (1960).
See generally Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties:
Sense or Nonsense, 1978 Wis. L RE V. 351.
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amount of damages suffered by the vendor in the event of the ven-
dee's subsequent default on the contract.
The essential distinction between the marketing contract and
the installment land contract lies in their purposes: one is a mar-
keting device, the other is a security contract. This distinction is
important in determining the rights and remedies available to the
parties. Remedies appropriate for one may not be appropriate for
the other,15 and the courts' failure to make the distinction between
the two types of contracts often leads to anomalous results.16
A mortgage is defined as "'any form of instrument whereby a
lien is created upon the real estate or whereby title to real estate is
reserved or conveyed as security for the payment of a debt or ful-
fillment of other obligation.' '-v In a lien state, such as Nebraska,
the property is conveyed only to the extent that the mortgagee is
deemed to have a lien on the property as security for a money obli-
gation; the conveyance does not create an estate or title in the
mortgagee.18 Like the installment land contract, the mortgage
serves as a security device for the purchase of real estate. 9 How-
ever, unlike the installment land contract situation, full title, legal
and equitable, is conveyed to the purchaser in a mortgage situation
in a lien state20 and a lien interest is created in the mortgagee.'
Nevertheless, a court of equity will disregard the location of the
title and will find that each party has equitable rights. The mortga-
gee has a security interest represented by his mortgage lien while
the mortgagor has an equity of redemption-a right to purchase
the property after default until the time of foreclosure.22 The law
of mortgages grew out of the courts of equity, and today in Ne-
15. Because of the interests at stake in an installment land contract, judicial fore-
closure may be appropriate. The marketing contract vendor, however, does
not need to rely on such a drawn out procedure to return the parties to their
original position. Hetland, supra note 14, at 738.
16. Hetland, supra note 14, at 729.
17. G. GLENN, supra note 6, § 1 (quoting from the Model Power of Sale Mortgage
Foreclosure Act, § 1(1)).
18. Comment, supra note 1, at 159.
19. Power, supra note 1, at 395.
20. Generally, a mortgagee's interest is a lien on the mortgaged property. How-
ever, in a few states, called title states, the mortgagee holds title to the prop-
erty and has a continuing right to possession. A few states retain a "hybrid"
or "intermediate" theory where the mortgagee is automatically entitled to
possession upon default. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND
TRANSFER AND FiNANCE 157 n.20 (1978).
21. It is this difference that provides support for both sides of the argument as to
whether rights and remedies available to the parties in a mortgagee-mortga-
gor relationship should be available to the vendor and vendee in an install-
ment land contract.
22. Hancock, supra note 6, at 977-78.
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braska, as in most other states, the rights and remedies of the par-
ties are governed by statute.23
Im. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS
When purchasers are unable to finance their real estate
purchases with cash they resort to credit transactions.24 This in-
ability to finance real estate purchases is the result of many fac-
tors: the increased cost of real estate,25 the unavailability of
alternate financing,26 and the increased demand caused by the de-
sire of individuals of all socioeconomic classes to own their own
homes.27
Various financing devices, including the mortgage, have been
used for many years, and each device has enjoyed varying degrees
of popularity.28 While not a new financing device, 29 the installment
land contract has been an attractive alternative to mortgage financ-
ing since the second World War.30 The accelerated demand for
low-equity financing, the increased secondary financing by land-
owners selling encumbered property, and the tax advantages re-
sulting to the seller due to payments deferred over a period of
years,31 all aid in accounting for the current popularity of install-
ment land contracts.3 2 The installment land contract has not been
limited to any one segment of the real estate market, but has been
23. See id. "Mortgage foreclosures in Nebraska are governed by statute and a
judicial sale is the exclusive way by which the mortgagor's equities or rights
in the land may be cut off. Any attempt by the mortgagee outside this statu-
tory procedure to sell the land and recover his money is void." Id. at 978
(emphasis in original). For the statutory procedures see NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-2137 to -2155 (Reissue 1979).
24. Comment, supra note 1, at 158.
25. Id. at 164.
26. Hines, supra note 11, at 475-79; Power, supra note 1, at 395-96.
27. Mixon, supra note 9, at 523.
28. See Hines, supra note 11, at 475; Lewis & Reeves, How the Doctrine of Equita-
ble Conversion Affects Land Sale Contract Forfeitures, 3 REAL EsT. LJ. 249,
249-54 (1974). See also Sherman, The Choice of Instruments as an Initial Elec-
tion of Remedies, 3 WILaAmETrE L.J. 153 (1965).
29. See McGovern, Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and the Availabil-
ity of Credit: An Historical Perspective, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 141, 154 (1979).
30. Hines, supra note 11, at 477; Comment, Florida Installment Land Contracts:
A Time for Reform, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 156, 156 (1975).
31. The tax advantages of the installment sale are also available to the mortgagee
who takes back a purchase money mortgage. While the payments typically
are to be made over a long period of time and are low in amount, receiving the
tax benefits of an installment sale requires only one payment beyond the
down payment. LR.C. § 453.
32. Hines, supra note 11, at 477.
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used in purchases of commercial real estate,33 farm property,34 and
residential housing.35
Historically installment land contracts have provided substan-
tial advantages to both vendors and vendees;36 however, the courts
in interpreting these contracts arguably have deprived the parties
of their perceived advantageous positions and perhaps rightly so.
The installment land contract provides the vendor with a distinct
advantage in the "time is of the essence" provision. If the vendee
fails to perform his obligations as set forth in the contract, the ven-
dor has the option to declare the contract terminated, to regain
possession of the property without legal process, and to retain, as
liquidated damages, payments made by the vendee up to the date
of defaut.37 At this point the contract is terminated and both par-
ties are relieved of all further contractual obligations.38 Thus, the
efficacy of the procedures for regaining possession of the property
render the installment land contract attractive to the seller.39 In
contrast, under the traditional mortgage remedy of judicial foreclo-
sure, the vendor must file for a foreclosure sale. If the vendee
seeks a stay on foreclosure,40 the vendor may find himself in ex-
pensive and protracted litigation, during which he is deprived of
both possession of his property and the economic benefits of the
transaction. 4 '
The forfeiture clause was initially construed by many courts in
favor of the vendor under a strict interpretation of contracts ration-
ale.42 Because the vendor was assured of regaining possession of
his property in an expeditious and inexpensive manner, he was
willing to offer the property for a lower down payment.4 3 Thus,
33. Power, supra note 1, at 406-08.
34. Dolson & Zile, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts, 1960 Wis. L
REV. 383, 383; Hines, supra note 11, at 475; Comment, supra note 1, at 164.
35. Mixon, supra note 9, at 523; Comment, supra note 1, at 164. Note, Reforming
the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land Sale Contracts, 47 S.
CAL L. REv. 191, 191 (1973).
36. See Lee, supra note 4, at 19; Comment, Comparison of California Mortgages,
Trust Deeds and Land Sale Contracts, 7 U.C.LA. L REV. 83, 97-102 (1960);
Comment, supra note 1, at 158.
37. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
38. Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 541, 542; Hines, supra note 11, at 476. See Comment, For-
feiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALB. L REV. 71 (1977).
39. Note, supra note 35, at 199; Comment, supra note 36, at 97-99.
40. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1506 (Reissue 1979). If the land contract is treated as
a mortgage, a stay of execution upon the request of the vendee will be upheld
as in the case of a mortgage. Spencer v. Moyer, 29 Neb. 305, 309, 45 N.W. 464,
466 (1890).
41. See Note, Toward Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts, 36 MoNT. L.
REV. 110 (1975).
42. See, e.g., Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713 (1898);
Hetland, supra note 14, at 731-32; Note, supra note 35, at 199.
43. See Dolson & Zile, supra note 34, at 393.
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property could be acquired by individuals financially unable to se-
cure the larger down payments required by institutions or individ-
uals providing mortgage money.4 4 Vendors use the installment
land contract in high risk transactions, such as low income tract
housing developments.4 5 They thus fill a gap left by the unavaila-
bility of credit from commercial lenders. 6 However, while the pur-
chaser receives the advantages of a lower down payment and
lower transaction costs (i.e., closing costs), the seller may receive
more from the buyer over the life of the contract than he would
receive under a similar mortgage arrangement.4 7
Courts since have applied a theory of equitable conversion4 8 to
the installment land contract, recognizing it as a security device to
which equitable principles should apply. Thus, vendors may not
be justified in a continued belief that the forfeiture clause will pro-
vide them with the same efficient means of regaining the prop-
erty.4 9 Furthermore, much of the vendee's risk of loss of his
investment under the forfeiture clause has been mitigated by court
decisions which allow the vendee to avoid its operation. Where
recognized, the vendee's equity of redemption, right to restitution,
and right to require a judicial sale have done much to protect the
vendee's interests.
Thus, the vendor's low costs in regaining possession may de-
pend on the vendee's acquiescence. "With increasing public
awareness of legal remedies, and the greater availability of legal
44. 'The installment contract for the purchase of real estate is used primarily in
the situation where the purchaser is unable to obtain financing in an amount
which, together with the purchaser's equity investment, will pay a construc-
tion cost or a purchase price in full" N. PENNEY & R. BROUDE, LAND FINANC-
ING 5 (1970).
45. Warren, California Instalment Land Sale Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 608, 608 (1962). It is clear that the "gap" in available financ-
ing money is not limited to the poor. The financing device is also welcome to
purchasers wanting to finance the purchase of farms, condominiums, high-
priced residences, and commercial property. Power, supra note 1, at 403-08.
46. Power, supra note 1, at 433.
47. While research of installment land contract purchases of Wisconsin farms
indicated that "[t]he interest rates of installment land contracts compare fa-
vorably with those of mortgages," Dolson & Zile, supra note 34, at 396, the
authors acknowledged that the seller may have added some "interest" in set-
ting a higher contract price. Id.
About the only advantage an installment vendee receives over the
middle income buyer who uses standard mortgage financing is the
low move-in cost. In a market where the seller knows and utilizes
available legal and economic power, the installment contract vendee
suffers the oft-seen plight of the poor. The buyer pays more and re-
ceives less.
Mixon, supra note 9, at 530.
48. See, e.g., Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954).
49. See Lewis & Reeves, supra note 28, at 249.
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services for low-income persons, that acquiescence is no longer as-
sured."50 The vendor who decides to sell using the installment
land contract may do so because he is "willing to gamble that the
vendee's rights under this device will never be asserted and his
own contractual advantages will not be challenged."51 Neverthe-
less, the device may still be used because vendors and real estate
brokers do not appreciate the risks of litigation in land contracts;
they may feel confident that the carefully drawn terms of their con-
tracts will be enforced. 52
Today, different reasons may underlie the vendor's choice of
the installment land contract as a financing device. The advanta-
geous tax treatment afforded payments received in an installment
sale may provide the impetus for the vendor's willingness to
finance the sale himself.53 More importantly, changing economic
conditions may compel the use of the installment land contract. A
willing seller may not be able to find a willing buyer who qualifies
for traditional financing methods. Thus, the seller who wants to
sell may be forced to finance the transaction himself, at least until
the buyer has built up enough equity to qualify for institutional
mortgage financing.54 Use of the installment land contract as an
interim security device can also benefit the purchaser. By immedi-
ately starting to purchase the property, the purchaser can realize
appreciation in the market value of his land and at the same time
accumulate sufficient equity to qualify for conventional mortgage
financing. 5
Other than the low down payment and the means to finance the
purchase of real estate when other alternatives are unavailable,
there are few advantages to the vendee. The vendee risks forfeit-
ing his interest in the property by even an inadvertent default; he
must rely on the court to protect that interest. Additionally, even if
he fully performs the contract, he has no assurance of receiving
marketable title to the property. To avert this misfortune he
should obtain an abstract of title before executing the contract and
then record his contract and require the deed to be held in es-
50. Note, supra note 41, at 111.
51. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 23 (2d ed. 1970); Warren,
supra note 45, at 633.
52. See Warren, supra note 45, at 633.
53. J. HETLAND, supra note 12, at 45. See Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,
ILR.C. § 453; note 31 & accompanying text supra.
54. Thus the contract would provide for installment payments to continue for a
period of time, typically three to five years. The balance of the contract would
then become due, requiring what is referred to as a balloon payment, usually
equal to the balance of the purchase price. At the time of the balloon pay-
ment the purchaser would most likely obtain a mortgage. The equity he built
up by making installment payments would aid his qualifying for the loan.
55. Power, supra note 1, at 433.
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crow.5 6 The vendee who has a choice should evaluate his position
under both financing devices and will probably prefer the mort-
gage because of the statutory protections afforded it.
IV. CONCEPT OF FORFEITURE
The forfeiture clause5 7 provides that once a purchaser defaults
in making any of his payments or in performing any of the other
contract obligations, he forfeits all that he has given under the con-
tract.5 8 Strict application of the forfeiture clause would result in
no legal action being required. The buyer's breach leaves title to
the property in the seller's possession and unencumbers the land
of all contractual obligations.59 As a result, the seller would con-
tinue to hold title to the property, would have a right to possession,
would retain all payments previously made by the purchaser, and
would have no further legal obligations to the purchaser. The pur-
chaser would be deprived of possession of the property and would
forfeit his equity in the property.
The "time is of the essence" provision intensifies the often dev-
astating results of the forfeiture clause. It allows forfeiture to op-
erate automatically, without further notice from the vendor.6 0 As
long as the vendor has not waived the "time is of the essence"
clause,61 the purchaser will be in default immediately after the
56. See Comment, supra note 36, at 101. Where the land contract has an escrow
provision providing that the deed will be held in escrow until payment of
purchase price, the grantor of an instrument held in escrow loses control over
it so long as the grantee does not default, even though he retains bare legal
title in the land as security for payment of the purchase price. Pike v. Triska,
165 Neb. 104, 120, 84 N.W.2d 311, 321 (1957).
57. Black's Law Dictionary defines forfeiture as "a deprivation or destruction of a
right in consequence of the non-performance of some obligation or condi-
tion." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 778 (4th ed. 1968) (citing Connellan v. Fed-
eral Life & Cas. Co., 134 Me. 104, 108, 182 A. 13, 14 (1935)).
58. The following is a sample contract forfeiture clause:
It is mutually understood and agreed that time is of the essence of
this agreement and that in the event of any payment, either of princi-
pal or interest, remaining unpaid for a space of thirty (30) days after
the same shall become due, or in case of failure of the second parties
to make due payment of all sums due the [vendors], or any breach of
any other covenant herein contained, this Contract shall, at the op-
tion of the first parties, be forfeited and determined and the second
parties shall forfeit all payments whatsoever made hereunder to the
first parties, and the first parties shall have immediate right to re-
entry and take possession of the lands and premises aforesaid.
Kirby v. Bergfield, 186 Neb. 242, 244, 182 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1970). See also Mar-
tin v. Baxter, 198 Neb. 640, 641, 254 N.W.2d 420, 421 (1977); Industrial Loan &
Inv. Co. v. Lowe, 173 Neb. 624, 627, 114 N.W.2d 393, 396 (1962).
59. Comment, supra note 38, at 80-81.
60. See Kear v. Hausman, 152 Neb. 512, 41 N.W.2d 850 (1950).
61. See Walker v. Burtless, 82 Neb. 211, 117 N.E. 349 (1908).
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time the payment was due. He has no grace period within which to
correct his default. These provisions are particularly harsh when
the purchaser has substantially performed the contract. As the
contract nears completion and the purchaser's cash investment be-
comes increasingly large, forfeiture results in a substantial loss to
the purchaser and in a windfall gain to the vendor.62 The possibil-
ity of this result has often been criticized.63
Automatic forfeiture under a "time is of the essence" provision
has been applied to both installment land contracts where there is
a long-term relationship between the vendor and vendee and mar-
keting contracts where it is contemplated that the parties will meet
on an established date to close the sale.64 The policy underlying
the use of this clause should be distinguished depending on the
type of contract involved.
The vendor who negotiates a marketing contract and fixes a
date upon which to tender the deed and receive full payment from
the purchaser sets a deadline for consummating the sale. If the
purchaser fails to perform at the stated time, the vendor has a
strong interest in declaring the contract breached in order to resell
the property. With a "time is of the essence" clause, the seller
may, without further action, terminate the contractual relationship
with the purchaser. In a contract where time has not been made of
the essence, the seller may declare the contract at an end only af-
ter providing notice of demand and allowing a reasonable time for
completion of the agreement.65
Under the installment land contract, however, the vendor re-
ceives periodic payments over a long period of time and his inter-
62. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 81 (1979).
63. See, e.g., Bailey, Forfeiture of illinois Real Estate Contracts: Suggested Statu-
tory Procedure, 57 ILL. B.J. 890 (1969); Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of
Contract, 5 MIN. L REV. 329 (1921); Bodenheimer, Forfeitures Under Real
Estate Installment Contracts in Utah, 3 UTAH L. REv. 30 (1952); Corbin, The
Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 YALE
L.J. 1013 (1931); Henson, Installment Land Contracts in Illinois: A Suggested
Approach to "Forfeiture," 7 DE PAuL I. Rv. 1 (1957); Hines, supra note 11;
McGovern, supra note 29; Power, supra note 1; Strausbaugh, Exorcising the
Forfeiture Clause from Real Estate Conditional Sales Contracts, 4 REAL. EST.
L.J. 71 (1975); Comment, supra note 38; Comment, supra note 4; Comment,
supra note 1; Comment, supra note 30; Note, Forfeiture and the Installment
Land Contract, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 83 (1968); Note, supra note 35; Note,
Recent Utah Developments on Forfeiture in Real Estate Contracts, 7 UTAH L
REv. 95 (1960).
64. The Nebraska Supreme Court does not distinguish the type of contract when
it discusses application of the clause. See generally Riffey v. Schulke, 193
Neb. 317, 227 N.W.2d 4 (1975); Kirby v. Bergfield, 186 Neb. 242, 182 N.W.2d 205
(1970); Patterson v. Murphy, 41 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1 (1894).
65. Foster v. Ley, 32 Neb. 404, 49 N.W. 450 (1891) (bond for deed). See also
Klapka v. Shrauger, 135 Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938).
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ests may be different. Often the vendor has periodic obligations he
must pay. When he relies on the purchaser's payments to satisfy
these obligations, late payments from the purchaser may cause
him to default on his own payments. Therefore, the "time is of the
essence" clause is to ensure a continuing flow of payments. The
clause is not applied consistently in installment land contracts; eq-
uitable considerations may enter the analysis, and courts may re-
quire notice of default 66 as well as a reasonable period of time
during which the purchaser can cure default.67
Under a marketing contract the parties negotiate an amount as
a down payment to compensate the vendor for delay in his receiv-
ing the balance of the contract price and for any other costs he
might incur in preparing to perform the contract. This amount rep-
resents the liquidated damages occurring as a consequence of the
purchaser's failure to perform. A court is free to refuse to enforce
the forfeiture of the down payment if the amount is out of propor-
tion to the damages caused by the breach.68 Nevertheless, a court
may enforce a liquidated damages provision "if the amount stipu-
lated is either a reasonable estimate of the probable damages or is
reasonably proportionate to the actual damages caused by the
breach." 69
In Bando v. Cole,70 the Nebraska court allowed forfeiture of a
$12,000 down payment. The purchasers had approached the sellers
and made an offer with a $12,000 down payment and the balance to
be paid on March 1. The sellers had demanded a fifteen percent
down payment because according to the contract they were to give
possession on the same day payment was tendered. To perform
their contractual obligations, the sellers were required to sell their
farm equipment and move. When the purchasers were unable to
secure financing, the purchase was not consummated. The pur-
chasers sued for return of the down payment and the court held
the payment to be liquidated damages.7 1 In addition to their mov-
ing expenses, the sellers had difficulty finding a tenant to farm the
land and when they did it was late and the crop yield was low.
66. Contra, Kear v. Hausmann, 152 Neb. 512, 518, 41 N.W.2d 850, 854 (1950).
67. Patterson v. Mikkelson, 86 Neb. 512, 515-16, 125 N.W. 1104, 1105 (1910); Foster v.
Ley, 32 Neb. 404, 410, 49 N.W. 450, 452 (1891). Contra, Abbas v. Demont, 152
Neb. 77, 82, 40 N.W.2d 265, 267-68 (1949).
68. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 14, at 351.
69. For a discussion of the distinction between enforceable liquidated damages
and unenforceable penalties, see Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 14, at
351.
70. 197 Neb. 722, 250 N.W.2d 651 (1977).
71. "Ordinarily a sum paid in part performance of a contract, with a provision
that it shall be forfeited in the event of default, if not excessive, and if the
actual damages are not calculable in advance, will be regarded as liquidated
damages." Id. at 726, 250 N.W.2d at 653 (citation omitted).
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The payments made by the installment land contract vendee
prior to default cannot be as easily classified as liquidated dam-
ages and thus as forfeitable. The installment payments represent
both principal and interest payments. In addition, the vendee may
have made tax and insurance payments and invested money in im-
provements. A forfeiture of all these payments would not neces-
sarily represent liquidated damages, and would most likely
penalize the vendee.7 2
The courts have recognized the inequity wrought by the opera-
tion of the forfeiture clause and have attempted to ameliorate the
harsh results.7 3 However, the approaches the jurisdictions have
taken in response to the problem, are 'not susceptible to orderly
analysis.7 4 Each case is dealt with pragmatically, with considera-
tion given to the contract provisions, the form of the action
brought, and an equitable weighing of the facts of the case.75 This
individualized approach has made it difficult to predict whether
the forfeiture clause will be enforced. "While forfeitures are still
occasionally judicially enforced, it nevertheless can be safely
stated that in no jurisdiction today will a vendor be able to assume
that forfeiture provisions will be automatically enforced as
written."76
Originally the installment land contract forfeiture clause
presented the vendor with a quick means of regaining his property.
Without expense and prolonged court proceedings, the vendor
could cancel the contract with the purchaser and declare forfei-
72. Comment, supra note 1, at 169.
73. Professor Ballantine argues for releasing the courts from enforcing harsh
contractual provisions that work forfeiture on a purchaser to the point of be-
ing a penalty. The parties are not allowed to fashion their own remedies if
the remedies unfairly penalize:
The law carefully limits the remedies which the parties may provide
for themselves by way of penalty, though called 'liquidated damages.'
But an express condition precedent may often involve a loss or a for-
feiture, 'as penal in its effects as a promise to pay a penalty.' This is
strikingly the case in installment contracts where time is declared to
be 'of the essence', and the buyer of land or goods may be subjected
to a forfeiture of all the payments he has made....
The courts of law as well as courts of equity are at liberty to disre-
gard express conditions where they are harsh and penal in their ef-
fects and provide for a penalty or forfeiture.
Ballantine, supra note 63, at 342-43. See Walker v. Burtless, 82 Neb. 211, 117
N.W. 329 (1908); Elsasser v. Wilcox, 286 Or. 775, 596 P.2d 974 (1979); notes 180-
266 & accompanying text infra.
74. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 547. Even the courts that seemingly al-
low the parties' contract to determine their rights and remedies will be open
to a determination that the amounts paid and retained constituted a penalty.
See, e.g., Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977).
75. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 543-44.
76. Id. at 544 (emphasis in original).
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ture. This is still the best remedy available to the vendor.77 The
problems arise when the purchaser asserts his equitable interest
in the property. The vendor must then resort to judicial
remedies.78
At one time a majority of courts held that a purchaser in default
lost his equitable interest in the land.79 Furthermore, he was de-
nied restitution because the contract's express terms made time of
the essence. This approach stems from the courts' articulated de-
sire to honor the parties' intent as manifested in their assent to the
contract terms as written.8 0 One case illustrative of this theory is
Dorman v. Fisher,8 1 an action for possession in the law division of
the New Jersey court. The court noted that it did not have the
power of an equity court to relieve the parties from an unconscion-
able agreement, but that it had to decide whether the vendor's re-
tention of title only as a security device precluded enforcement of
the sanctions specified in the agreement.8 2 The court noted that
there was no showing of either unfairness or inequitable circum-
stances, and held that the vendor's retention of title as a security
device did not preclude enforcement of the contractual sanctions
for the purchaser's default.83 The vendor therefore seems more
likely to succeed in a law cause of action with a strict contract in-
terpretation theory84 than in an equity proceeding.
Two recent cases illustrate the courts' continued reticence to
rewrite the parties' agreement. In Ellis v. Butterfield,85 the Idaho
Supreme Court refused to grant the defaulting vendee either spe-
cific performance of a contract or any equitable right to redemp-
tion despite of the vendee's willingness to tender the payments
due. The contract had provided for default after the payment was
delinquent thirty days. The majority, concerned with preserving
the installment land sale contract as an alternative financing de-
77. J. HETLAND, supra note 12, at 47.
78. The purchaser may assert his equity of redemption which would be difficult
for the vendor to discharge without court action. Id. at 47-62.
79. Contra, Elsasser v. Wilcox, 286 Or. 775, 596 P.2d 974 (1979).
80. See Maloy v. Muir, 62 Neb. 80,86 N.W. 916 (1901); Patterson v. Murphy, 41 Neb.
818, 60 N.W. 1 (1894).
81. 52 N.J. Super. 70, 144 A.2d 805 (1958), affld, 31 N.J. 13, 155 A.2d 11 (1959). See
Lewis & Reeves, supra note 28, at 256.
82. 52 N.J. Super. at 74, 144 A.2d at 807. "The contract approach to the sale of
realty is not inherently invidious. On the contrary, it meets a social need
especially where a prospective purchaser is unable to make a down payment
sufficient to induce an immediate conveyance." Dorman v. Fisher, 31 N.J. 13,
15, 155 A.2d 11, 12 (1959).
83. 31 NJ. at 15, 155 A.2d at 12.
84. See Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949). Dorman v. Fisher,
like Abbas v. Demont, was a law action for possession.
85. 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977).
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vice, based its decision on two points. First, the parties chose the
installment land contract over other financing methods which, al-
though more expensive to the vendee, would have provided more
protection for his interest.86 Second, the vendee did not challenge
the amount forfeited as exorbitant or a penalty.8 7
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Barker v. Johnson,88 also de-
nied the defaulting vendee specific performance of his contract
when he tendered the purchase price after the fifteen-day grace
period allowed in the contract. The court said that the contract
represented a commercial transaction between competent parties
in which there was no equitable basis to refuse to enforce the for-
feiture term.89 The court noted that although forfeitures are not
favored, a court of equity is not justified in setting aside a valid
contractual obligation of the parties in the absence of some equita-
ble reason. The tender of the full purchase price after default did
not qualify as an equitable reason to ignore default and order spe-
cific performance.9 0
The Barker court left open the possibility of construing the par-
ties' contract as creating an equitable mortgage upon a showing
that the parties intended their contract to be an equitable mort-
gage rather than an installment land contract.9 ' The court did not
offer guidelines as to what would be held to show sufficient intent.
Many states have established statutory relief from the opera-
tion of the forfeiture clause.9 2 Additionally, numerous courts have
86. Id. at 646, 570 P.2d at 1336. The dissent in Ellis should be noted, as it presents
a complete review of case law and law review articles supporting the equity
rights of the defaulting vendee.
87. Id. at 648, 570 P.2d at 1339. Other courts have enforced the terms of the par-
ties' contract by denying the vendee's right to cure the default. Younglove v.
Graham & Hill, 526 P.2d 689 (Wyo. 1974). In Younglove the vendees, after re-
ceiving notice of their 30 day period to cure the default, tendered the required
payment 10 days after the end of the grace period. The court held that forfei-
ture of 29% of the purchase price was not alone sufficient to sustain an equi-
table defense. Because the vendee had the benefit of the gravel it was
extracting, the court could find no equitable basis to disregard failure to
perform.
88. 591 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979).
89. Id. at 889.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 890.
92. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741 to -742 (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1442,2889,3369(1) (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1403 (Harrison 1977); id.
§ 37-216 (Harrison 1979); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 67-40, 171-99(h) (1976); IOWA
CODE §§ 656.1-.6 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92945 to "2946 (West 1951); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6051(2) (1964); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101
to -108 (Supp. 1980); MIcH. Comp. LAws §§ 554.301-.302, 600.3101 (1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 28-1-104 (1979);
ND. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to -06 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5313.01-.10 (Anderson 1981); OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11(A) (Supp. 1980);
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fashioned theories upon which to base their refusals to enforce for-
feiture clauses against defaulting vendees. These theories have
been premised on either mortgage or contract principles, or a com-
bination of the two. These theories often are not theoretically pre-
cise.9 3 Theories employed by the Nebraska Supreme Court
include: vendor's waiver of strict performance of the contract,94 re-
demption,95 restitution,96 and the requirement of foreclosure by ju-
dicial sale.97
V. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO VENDOR UPON
VENDEE'S DEFAULT
Remedies available to the vendor when the vendee defaults in-
clude: rescinding the contract, forfeiting the vendee's payments,
seeking specific performance, suing for damages for the breach,
foreclosing the contract as a mortgage,98 and strictly foreclosing,
which includes an action for ejectment or for quiet title.
While the vendor's contract seemingly provides him with a rem-
edy upon the vendee's default, when the default occurs the vendor
may discover that his contract remedy is empty, indeed. The ven-
dor chose the installment land contract as a financing device over
the mortgage or deed of trust because it gave him an easy way to
regain possession of the property.99 The effectiveness of an install-
ment land contract remedy depends on the vendor's being able to
declare a forfeiture and to have the vendee quit possession and not
assert any rights that may cloud the vendor's title.10 0 However, if a
court recognizes the vendee's equity of redemption, this recogni-
tion will cloud the vendor's title.101 Therefore the vendor must
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 901-911 (Purdon 1965); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 21-50-
1 to -7 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 843.01 (West 1977).
93. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 547.
94. For a discussion of waiver see notes 262-66 & accompanying text infra.
95. For a discussion of redemption see notes 206-34 & accompanying text infra.
96. For a discussion of restitution see notes 235-60 & accompanying text infra.
97. For a discussion of the vendee's right to require foreclosure by judicial sale,
see notes 181-205 & accompanying text infra.
98. Colson v. Johnson's Estate, 111 Neb. 773, 776, 197 N.W. 674,675 (1924). See also
Hancock, supra note 6, at 982; Peterson, supra note 5, at 271.
99. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 543.
100. The forfeiture clause in an installment contract appears to give the
vendor a remedy similar to foreclosure without any need for judicial
action. For our purposes, however, it is important to emphasize that
if the vendee resists forfeiture the installment land contract is advan-
tageous only if it is enforceable as written and if title will not be
clouded.
Id. at 542-43 (emphasis in original). See also Comment, Installment Contracts
for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. RE V. 240, 244 (1959).
101. See notes 206-34 & accompanying text infra.
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have a means of shaking off the "clinging equity of the vendee." 0 2
A. Strict Foreclosure
Strict foreclosure bars the vendee's equity of redemption and
vests title in the vendor without requiring a sale of the property.103
While several remedies will eliminate the vendee's equitable inter-
est,104 strict foreclosure is the least severe to the vendee because it
provides him some means of protecting his interest in the prop-
erty. A court in decreeing strict foreclosure will establish a set
time, or grace period, during which the purchaser can complete his
payments and receive full title to the property.lOS If the vendee
does not take advantage of his right to make payments, strict fore-
closure accomplishes the same result as an action to quiet title.
Title is confirmed in the hands of the vendor and all color of title
held by the vendee will be extinguished.106
102. G. GLENN, supra note 6, § 67.1. The vendee has a lien similar to the vendor's
lien.
Where the vendee has paid any part of the purchase money on the
faith of the contract of sale before a conveyance has been made to
him, equity gives him a lien upon the title of the vendor for the
amount so advanced, which has all the characteristics of the vendor's
lien, and is enforceable in the same way against the vendor and all
his privies who have notice.
C. TIEDEMAN, THE AMERICAN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 220 (3d ed. 1906).
Installment land contracts are most often used in states such as Nebraska,
where foreclosure remedies are pro-mortgagor, and judicial foreclosure is the
only remedy in the mortgage context. The vendor is more willing to use in-
stallment land contra6ts and to risk some judicial proceedings to regain pos-
session of his property and to clear his title in states where the alternative is
lengthy mandatory proceedings which include stay of foreclosure.
103. A decree of strict foreclosure of a mortgage finds the amount due
under the mortgage, orders its payment within a certain limited time,
and provides that, in default of such payment, the debtor's right and
equity of redemption shall be forever barred and foreclosed; its effect
is to vest the title of the property absolutely in the mortgagee, on
default in payment without any sale of property.
BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 775 (4th ed. 1968).
104. Either actions for ejectment or to quiet title will eliminate the vendee's inter-
est in the property. Strict foreclosure will be available to foreclose a land
contract where either of these actions lie. T. DYSART, FOREcLosuREs IN NE-
BRASKA § 188 (1929). Since Dysart's book was published, Nebraska Supreme
Court decisions suggest that in equity, no matter what action is brought, the
court will analyze the equities of deeming the vendee's payments forfeited.
See, e.g., Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (action in eject-
ment, court held strict foreclosure not appropriate); Hawkins v. Mullen, 118
Neb. 129, 223 N.W. 670 (1929).
105. T. DYSART, supra note 104, § 251. See note 132 & accompanying text infra.
106. T. DYSART, supra note 104, § 188. Strict foreclosure functions not to pass title
from the purchaser to the vendor, but merely to confirm the title retained by
the vendor. Thus strict foreclosure in Nebraska is available only in install-
ment land contract circumstances where the purchaser does not receive title
1981]
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The vendor who wants to resort to this remedy should realize
that courts hesitate to allow strict foreclosure. 0 7 Once strict fore-
closure is decreed, the vendee is limited to the stated time to
tender full payment according to the contract. At the end of that
period his equity of redemption is considered foreclosed. Unlike
ordinary foreclosure, there is no provision for a stay of foreclo-
sure; 08 thus there is no possibility of a sale to a third party at an
amount more than sufficient to pay the vendor's claim. 09 Because
any equity the vendee may have established in the property would
be forever foreclosed, the Nebraska Supreme Court has followed
the majority trend in decreeing strict foreclosure "only under pe-
culiar and special circumstances.""10 Such actions will be allowed
only when in the sound discretion of the court it would be "inequi-
table or unjust to refuse them.""'
Unlike a judicial foreclosure procedure where each party knows
his rights and responsibilities in the action, the parties in a strict
foreclosure proceeding are subject to the court's discretion as to
whether and under what conditions foreclosure will be granted. In
Nebraska, the availability of the strict foreclosure remedy does not
depend on the type of action filed or on the parties' express con-
tract provision for forfeiture."12 While the Nebraska Supreme
Court has applied both contract and mortgage remedies to install-
ment land contracts, the decisions rest on equitable grounds. The
vendor should draft his contract carefully, to attempt to provide for
forfeiture and foreclosure without requiring or allowing a court to
until he has fulfilled his contractual obligations. Strict foreclosure is not
available to foreclose a mortgagor's interest under a mortgage contract. Id.
§§ 250-252.
107. See Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 MnN. L REV. 342
(1929).
108. Mortgage stay of execution does not apply to decrees of strict foreclosure.
Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 186-88, 56 N.W. 961, 964 (1893).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979); Corn Belt
Products Co. v. Mullins, 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961); Ruhl v. Johnson,
154 Neb. 810,49 N.W.2d 687 (1951); Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W.
961 (1893).
111. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979); Corn Belt
Products Co. v. Mullins, 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961); Ruhl v. Johnson,
154 Neb. 810,49 N.W.2d 687 (1951); Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W.
961 (1893).
112. Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961 (1893); Foster v. Ley, 32 Neb.
404, 49 N.W. 450 (1891). In Foster there was no provision for forfeiture upon
default in the contract. The purchaser argued that the court could not create
a provision of forfeiture so that the contract should be treated as a mortgage
and be foreclosed by a judicial sale. The court forfeited the interest of the
purchaser, but did say a judicial sale would be enforced if that were the rem-
edy the vendor preferred.
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weigh equitable considerations. However, recent decisions indi-
cate that before decreeing strict foreclosure the court will consider
the equities of the situation." 3 Alternatively, the vendor may seek
to have the contract strictly enforced by bringing an action in eq-
uity to quiet title or an action at law for ejectment." 4 The court
has not established a consistent approach to the possible claims
for relief that may be brought. In an equity action the court is not
inclined to strictly interpret the terms of the parties' contract if it is
unfair or inequitable to the vendee."15
Strict foreclosure is available where the property is of less
value than the contract price and would not result in a surplus over
price if a sale were ordered.116 The court recognizes the futility of
requiring a sale of the property if the amount that would be re-
ceived from a sale is less than the amount of the debt. On the
other hand, strict foreclosure will be denied where the value of the
property is "substantially in excess of the amount owed."" 7 In Rif-
fey v. Schulke,118 the plaintiff commenced an action to declare a
forfeiture of the contract and to eject the defendant, whereupon
113. See, e.g., Riffey v. Schulke, 193 Neb. 317, 227 N.W.2d 4 (1975). One Nebraska
commentator stated that the question whether "the parties [can] contract in
such a way as to bring about forfeiture or strict foreclosure without a court
foreclosure proceeding governed by those equitable considerations that pre-
viously guided a court of equity" is undecided. Hancock, supra note 6, at 983.
This question remains undecided and may depend on the type of action
brought by the vendor. See note 114 infra.
114. The court has held in an ejectment action that if the contract states that time
is of the essence and provides for forfeiture, the vendees will not be granted
redemption. Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77,40 N.W.2d 265 (1949). But cf. Rif-
fey v. Schulke, 193 Neb. 317, 227 N.W.2d 4 (1975) (action brought for eject-
ment, court decreed that strict forfeiture inequitable); Ruhl v. Johnson, 154
Neb. 810,49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (same). For further discussion see notes 160-72
& accompanying text infra. The court seemingly has allowed forfeiture in
quiet title actions by looking at the express terms of the contract. Industrial
Loan & Inv. Co. v. Lowe, 173 Neb. 624,114 N.W.2d 393 (1962); Kear v. Hausman,
152 Neb. 512,41 N.W.2d 850 (1950); Gilmore v. Cover, 134 Neb. 559,279 N.W. 177
(1938). Contra, Hawkins v. Mullen, 118 Neb. 129, 223 N.W. 670 (1929). But see
notes 157-59, 168 & accompanying text infra.
115. See, e.g., Yelkin v. Yelkin, 193 Neb. 789, 229 N.W.2d 59 (1975).
116. Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945).
[A] contract for the purchase of real estate may be strictly foreclosed
where it is clear that the property is of less value than the contract
price and that it would not bring a surplus over and above the
amount due if a sale were ordered and where such procedure would
not offend against justice and equity.
Id. at 820, 18 N.W.2d at 220; State Sec. Co. v. Daringer, 206 Neb. 427, 430, 293
N.W.2d 102, 104 (1980).
117. Yelkin v. Yelkin, 193 Neb. 789,229 N.W.2d 59 (1975); Riffey v. Schulke, 193 Neb.
317, 227 N.W.2d 4 (1975). See Martin v. Baxter, 198 Neb. 640, 254 N.W.2d 420
(1977).
118. 193 Neb. 317, 227 N.W.2d 4 (1975).
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the defendant answered that strict foreclosure would be inequita-
ble." 9 The vendee had improved the property and its value had
increased to $125,000 from the $34,000 contract price. The vendee
was to pay $3,000 a year plus seven percent interest starting in
1970. The vendee took possession and made interest payments un-
til 1972; however, no principal installments were made and the ven-
dee did not make the tax payments required by the contract.120
Seemingly ignoring the vendee's default, the court was impressed
instead with the facts that an intervenor bank stood ready to pay
off the contract and that the land had significantly appreciated in
value. Because performance, although late, was tendered accord-
ing to the amount stated in the contract, the court held that strict
foreclosure was unavailable.121 The court was unmoved by the
vendor's objection that he would not be made whole by a lump
sum payment because the income tax consequences of the trans-
action would be less advantageous to him than the installment
payments he had contracted to receive. 122 Pointing to the contract
terms which provided for an escalation of all installments upon de-
fault,123 the court required the vendor to perform the contract.
Strict foreclosure also will be enforced if the court finds that the
payments which the vendee would forfeit equal the rental value of
the property for the time he was in possession.124 In addition to
payments made on the contract, the court will consider payments
made by the vendee for improvements, repairs, taxes, and insur-
ance in determining whether the amount forfeited by the vendee
exceeds the property's rental value. 25
The analysis used in installment land contract cases to decide
whether to enforce strict foreclosure emphasizes what the vendee
has received in return for his payments to the vendor. While there
119. Id. at 318, 227 N.W.2d at 5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 320-21, 227 N.W.2d at 6-7. See notes 206-34 & accompanying text infra.
See also Dowd Grain Co. v. Pflug, 193 Neb. 483,227 N.W.2d 610 (1975); Kirby v.
Bergfield, 186 Neb. 242, 182 N.W.2d 205 (1970). Contra, Barker v. Johnson, 591
P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979).
122. 193 Neb. at 321, 227 N.W.2d at 7.
123. One wonders whether a vendor who puts an acceleration clause into his con-
tract is concerned with receiving the purchase price or merely wants a means
to declare forfeiture so that he can resell the property on an installment ba-
sis. The vendor is interested in favorable tax treatment of installment pay-
ments, but the vendee wants his payments to have some protection from
default.
124. See Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979); Swanson v. Mad-
sen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945); Stroble v. Smith, 131 Neb. 291,267 N.W.
526 (1936).
125. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979); Yelkin v.
Yelkin, 193 Neb. 789, 229 N.W.2d 59 (1975); Riffey v. Schulke, 193 Neb. 317, 227
N.W.2d 4 (1975).
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have been no cases where damages (such as the costs of litigation,
personal relocation expenses, or lost profits) have been asserted as
they were in the executory contract case of Bando v. Cole, 2 6 ar-
guably these should be part of the court's equitable considerations.
The court's analysis should center on whether special circum-
stances have been shown that make it inequitable to refuse strict
foreclosure. 27
If a vendee has established a significant equity interest in the
property, the court will refuse strict foreclosure.128 In determining
the vendee's equity in the property, the court will consider the
vendee's payments to the vendor and the vendee's expenditures
for property improvements.129 Other relationships between the
parties may be considered as well. For example, in Corn Belt Prod-
ucts Co. v. Mullins,130 the Nebraska Supreme Court granted strict
foreclosure of the vendee's interest in the property despite the
substantial equity that the vendee had established. The land con-
tract was between an employer-vendor and an employee-vendee.
That the employee had converted a considerable amount of the
employer's property to his own use without permission influenced
the court in finding that the vendee's equity was insufficient to
make strict foreclosure inequitable.13'
A court may mitigate the consequences of strict foreclosure on
the defaulting vendee by finding he is entitled to a reasonable time
to perform his obligations under the contract.132 Although the
126. 197 Neb. 722, 250 N.W.2d 651 (1977). For a discussion of the case see notes 70-
71 & accompanying text supra.
127. The court has approached its equity analysis from both a positive and nega-
tive viewpoint. Either way, the outcome apparently is not affected. Whether
the court says it will grant "strict foreclosure only under peculiar and special
circumstances," see, e.g., Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961
(1893), or attempts to decide whether special circumstances making it inequi-
table to refuse strict foreclosure have been shown, its analysis is the same.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979).
128. Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951); Farmers & Merchants
State Bank v. Thornburg, 54 Neb. 782, 75 N.W. 45 (1898). If the vendor is re-
fused strict foreclosure he must find another remedy. In Thornburg, the
court said the vendor must go through ordinary foreclosure. See notes 201-05
& accompanying text infra.
129. See, e.g., Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951). The
"[d] efendants alleged that by virtue of payments made to plaintiffs and ex-
penditures made on the property, they had an equitable title to the property,
and that plaintiffs by action of ejectment were undertaking to deny a right to
redeem under a judicial foreclosure." Id. at 812, 49 N.W.2d at 688.
130. 172 Neb. 561, 110 N.W.2d 845 (1961).
131. Id. at 571, 110 N.W.2d at 851. The vendee would have been found to have had
equity in the property only if the real estate contract were considered to be a
separate matter from other transactions between the parties. "Such a view
ignores the true factual situation." Id at 570, 110 N.W.2d at 851.
132. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119,277 N.W.2d 564 (1979) (vendee given
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time period allowed for this right to redeem the property is not as
great as in a statutory stay of a judicial foreclosure proceeding, 33
the same interest is satisfied.
The vendor has the right to elect his remedy and generally is
allowed to do so. 134 In Hendrix v. Barker, 35 the vendor elected to
foreclose the vendee's interest as an ordinary mortgage and then
to bring an action for a deficiency judgment. 3 6 The vendee was
not allowed to limit the vendor to strict foreclosure in an effort to
avoid further liability on the contract. 3 7
B. Foreclosure by Judicial Sale
"Of the various remedies available to the vendor, foreclosure by
judicial sale is the most equitable in that by equating the contract
to a mortgage it gives the purchaser the benefit of all of the safe-
guards that equity has created over the years for the benefit of
mortgagors."138 Unfortunately the remedy is both expensive and
time consuming. "[T] he merit of foreclosure by sale is that it does
not work a forfeiture of the purchaser's interest, that it is open and
fair, and that it will result in clearing the vendor's title of any claim
by the purchaser."139 However, the vendor is not always inter-
ested in fairness to the vendee and may choose a less cumbersome
remedy that is equally effective in clearing his title. 40 If foreclo-
20 days to redeem); Peckham v. Deans, 186 Neb. 190, 181 N.W.2d 851 (1970)
(vendee given 60 days to redeem by purchasing remaining lots in contract);
Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee given 60 days
to redeem); Stroble v. Smith, 131 Neb. 291, 267 N.W. 526 (1936) (vendee given
30 days to redeem); Sponsler v. Max, 113 Neb. 477,203 N.W. 566 (1925) (vendee
given 60 days to redeem); Patterson v. Mikkelson, 86 Neb. 512, 125 N.W. 1104
(1910) (vendee given 90 days to redeem); Maloy v. Muir, 62 Neb. 80, 86 N.W.
916 (1901) (vendee given 20 days to perform contract).
133. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1506 (Reissue 1979). Upon application by the mort-
gagor within 20 days after the decree of foreclosure, the court's decree order-
ing the sale of the property is stayed for nine months.
134. See Hendrix v. Barker, 49 Neb. 369, 68 N.W. 531 (1896). But see Ruhl v. John-
son, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951). See also T. DYSART, supra note 103,
§ 186.
135. 49 Neb. 369, 68 N.W. 531 (1896).
136. Id. at 373, 68 N.W. at 532. A vendor is eligible to file for a deficiency judgment
only if he has elected to foreclose the vendee's interest by judicial sale. Han-
cock, supra note 6, at 982.
137. 49 Neb. at 373, 68 N.W. at 533.
138. Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MiAm L.
REv. 550, 558 (1965).
139. I&
140. In Foster v. Ley, the vendees argued that the contract must be treated as a
mortgage, and a sale of the property must be ordered to satisfy the vendor,
with the remainder of the proceeds from the sale going to the vendee. The
court responded: "Undoubtedly this remedy might be enforced if preferred
by the vendor, and might be more satisfactory to the vendee in view of a stat-
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sure by sale is chosen, the statutory provisions for sale and right of
redemption, including the availability of a nine-month stay of exe-
cution, must be followed.141 These procedures are required de-
spite provisions in the contract that provide for a different manner
of disposition in the event of the vendee's default.
C. Quiet Title
Historically, a vendee's failure to record an installment land
contract enabled the vendor to obtain a clear title upon the ven-
dee's default and the vendor's subsequent regaining of posses-
sion.142 Thus, vendors tried to ensure unrecordability by inserting
a clause in the contract stating that recording the contract would
be held to be a forfeiture or by failing to acknowledge the contract
and thus making it unrecordable. The courts do not look favorably
upon an anti-recording clause and will find it to be against public
policy.143
The vendee, even the willfully defaulting vendee, will find it
simple to encumber title.144 The vendee's outstanding equity of re-
demption does not need to be recorded to cloud the title. 45 The
equity of redemption can be asserted by the vendee in the vendor's
action for specific performance of the contract breached and the
recording of the notice of lis pendens. 46 This will block any effec-
tive or profitable resale until the vendor has filed and succeeded in
an action to foreclose the vendee's equity.
The vendor may bring an action for quiet title to make the for-
feiture of the defaulting vendee effective and to confirm title in the
vendor.147 The action is brought to extinguish any liens the vendee
might assert against the property and to prevent the vendee's equi-
table interest from clouding the title. A quiet title action is not
used to obtain possession, but rather to determine title. If the de-
faulting vendee remains in possession, ejectment would be the
proper remedy for the vendor to obtain possession. 48
While commentators state that the effect of a successful quiet
title proceeding is "equivalent to a modified form of strict foreclo-
sure,"149 the law in Nebraska is not settled. In an action for quiet
utory stay of execution of nine months after judgment. But we do not find
that to be the only remedy." 32 Neb. 404, 409, 49 N.W. 450, 451 (1891).
141. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1506 (Reissue 1979).
142. Id.
143. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 571.
144. Id
145. J. HETLAND, supra note 12, § 2.5.
146. Warren, supra note 45, at 632.
147. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,112 (Reissue 1979); T. DYSAnr, supra note 104, § 187.
148. T. DYSART, supra note 104, § 187.
149. Note, supra note 35, at 206.
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title it is unclear whether the court will apply the equitable consid-
erations defined in strict foreclosure cases or strictly construe the
forfeiture clause. In an early case, the vendor had filed an action to
quiet title, and the court allowed the purchase price to be returned
to the vendee, stating that it was doing equity.1S0 The court indi-
cated that the vendor chose to come into an equity court, and "he
who seeks equity must do equity."' 5 i In a later quiet title action
brought by a vendor, the court did not apply an equitable analy-
sis,15 2 but stated that "[a] contract of sale and purchase of real es-
tate, in which time in relation to deferred payments of the
purchase price is made of the essence of the contract, and a forfei-
ture provided for non-performance, may be enforced in accordance
with the terms of the express stipulation."153
In 1962, in Industrial Loan and Investment Co. v. Lowe, the
court upheld a quiet title action in an installment land contract, 54
and implied that the results of actions brought by a vendor for
strict foreclosure are not applicable to actions brought to quiet title
or brought at law in ejectment. 55 However, the court made the
type of analysis common in strict foreclosure cases, noting that the
payments were five months in arrears, the vendee had abandoned
the property, the vendee had assumed no obligation under the con-
tract due to the absence of privity between the vendee and the
vendor, and the property was in bad repair and depreciating in
value. Thus, there were no inequities in the court's enforcement of
the forfeiture by granting quiet title.i5 6 Since Lowe, no Nebraska
case has involved a quiet title action brought on an installment
land contract. Arguably, in an equitable proceeding to quiet title,
the court will perform the same analysis as it does in strict foreclo-
sure cases and quiet title will not be granted where forfeiture is
inappropriate. 5 7 According to the quiet title statute, the vendee is
150. Hawkins v. Mullen, 118 Neb. 129, 223 N.W. 670 (1929).
151. Id. at 135, 223 N.W. at 672.
The court having taken jurisdiction on this issue could retain it to do
full justice between the parties.... The appellee has brought an
action to quiet title by having a quit claim deed canceled as a cloud
upon his title. He comes into a court of conscience, and will not be
allowed unconscionable relief, nor relief otherwise than under condi-
tion that he do equity upon his part.
Id.
152. Kear v. Hausman, 152 Neb. 512,41 N.W.2d 850 (1950). Accord, Johnson v. Nor-
ton, 152 Neb. 714, 42 N.W.2d 622 (1950).
153. 152 Neb. at 518, 41 N.W.2d at 854.
154. 173 Neb. 624, 114 N.W.2d 393 (1962). The quiet title action was brought by the
plaintiff "as an assignee by virtue of an assignment of the vendees for secur-
ity only." Id. at 631, 114 N.W.2d at 398.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 631-32, 114 N.W.2d at 398.
157. "It would seem that in either event [strict foreclosure or action to quiet title]
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not given the right to redeem the property;158 however, because it
is an equitable proceeding the court can grant a right to redeem or
reinstate the contract on specific conditions, thus giving the quiet
title action the same effect as strict foreclosure.159
D. Action for Ejectment
A vendor may be able to bring an action for ejectment against a
defaulting vendee, and thereby avoid the equitable determination
which a court makes in an action for strict foreclosure.160 In Abbas
v. Demont,161 the vendor was granted relief in an action for eject-
ment brought under section 25-2124.162 The vendee had contracted
to buy the land for $8,950 and defaulted after paying $2,143.80. The
contract provided that time was of the essence and that a forfeiture
could be declared upon the vendee's default. The court held that
ejectment was available against the vendee in possession upon the
vendee's default of the contract.l0 The supreme court reversed
the trial court's grant of a sixty day redemption period to the ven-
dee, finding that upon default, the vendor had the right by the
terms of the contract to cancel the contract and forfeit the pay-
ments made. Since the contract no longer existed, the vendee
could claim no rights thereunder, not even a redemption right164
Although ejectment is a law action, the court will allow the defend-
ant to plead an equitable defense.165 The court recognized this in
the vendor was seeking equity and that he should be required to do equity."
Lee, supra note 138, at 560.
158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,116 (Reissue 1979).
159. See T. DYsART, supra note 104, § 187. A California court stated in Petersen v.
Ridenour, 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 728, 287 P.2d 848, 852 (1955):
A quiet title action brought to terminate a contract for the sale of
realty is essentially a strict foreclosure.... And in 'such case the
court finds the amount unpaid, and decrees that it be paid on or
before a day stated, and upon failure to make the payment that de-
fendant's equity be foreclosed.'
I& (quoting Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 138 Cal. 651, 654, 72 P. 345, 346 (1903)).
160. See Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949). But see Riffey v.
Schulke, 193 Neb. 317, 227 N.W.2d 4 (1975); Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49
N.W.2d 687 (1951).
161. 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949).
162. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2124 (Reissue 1979) provides:
In an action for the recovery of real property, it shall be sufficient if
the plaintiff states in his petition that he has a legal estate therein,
and is entitled to the possession thereof, describing the same, and
that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of the possession. It
shall not be necessary to state how the plaintiffs estate or ownership
is derived.
163. 152 Neb. at 81, 40 N.W.2d at 267.
164. Id. at 82, 40 N.W.2d at 267.
165. Id. at 80, 40 N.W.2d at 267.
'he defendant was entitled to have this issue submitted to the jury,
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Abbas; nevertheless, the court did not apply the tests set forth in
strict foreclosure cases.166 The court instead stated it would hold
the vendor strictly to his contract.167
The vendor seeking court-enforced ejectment must be sure his
contract is drafted carefully. To enforce forfeiture by ejectment
the vendor should include the following provisions in his contract:
"(1) time is of the essence, (2) the seller is entitled to immediate
possession in case of default, (3) amounts paid in shall be consid-
ered as rents or damages, (4) the entire amount is due and owing
on default, and (5) the contract shall be forfeited and at an end at
the election of the seller."' 68
Additionally, the vendor should ensure he has not waived per-
formance of any of the contract terms. "The law dislikes forfeit-
ures,"169 and as indicated in Abbas, a court will examine the
parties' actions to determine whether the vendor has waived per-
formance of any term of the contract.170
However, in light of a decision rendered after Abbas,171 there is
or, if plaintiff's contention that, being an equitable defense, it was for
the court to decide, is correct, the record should show affirmatively
that the issue was passed upon by the court and a finding made of
the facts as in any other case in equity, or that the question was sub-
mitted to the jury for an advisory verdict upon special findings.'
Id. (quoting Tillson v. Holloway, 90 Neb. 481, 487, 134 N.W. 232, 235 (1912)).
166. Arguably the vendee could assert that the amounts he had paid exceeded fair
rental value for the period, that the fair market value of the property greatly
exceeded the amount for which he was in default, or that he had established
a large amount of equity in the property.
167. 152 Neb. at 81,40 N.W.2d at 267. The parties in Abbas had entered into a sup-
plemental agreement providing that the defendant would pay an additional
$500 within 60 days to reduce the principal The vendee claimed that the ven-
dor had waived payment of the $500 while the vendor agreed only that the
date of payment had been extended. Evidence was presented that the date
for payment of the $500 was extended for an indefinite period of time. Id.
The court found that the vendor had waived forfeiture as to the $500 "until
notice is first given sufficient to reinstate the right to forfeit it because of the
failure to make this payment." Id. For further discussion of the protection
the waiver theory affords the defaulting vendee, see notes 260-64 & accompa-
nying text infra.
168. Hancock, supra note 6, at 985. It is not certain that the court would enforce a
clause converting payments made into rents if it finds their amount not equal
to the fair rental value. If instead the amount forfeited is unconscionable, the
court may disregard the label attached and view it as a penalty. See notes 68-
71 & accompanying text supra.
169. E.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 231, 301 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 79, 40 N.W.2d 265,
267 (1949).
170. 152 Neb. at 81, 40 N.W.2d at 267.
171. Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951). See also Riffey v.
Schulke, 193 Neb. 317,227 N.W.2d 4 (1975) where the vendor filed an action for
forfeiture and ejectment and the vendee answered that the property had in-
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no guarantee that the inequities of forfeiture will not.be consid-
ered in an action for ejectment. In Ruhl v. Johnson,172 a vendor's
action at law for ejectment was transferred to the equity docket
upon motion by the defendant. Although the trial court granted
strict foreclosure to the vendor, the Nebraska Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that "[t]here are no peculiar and special circum-
stances shown that make it inequitable and unjust to refuse strict
foreclosure."173
In this area of law, jury sympathies likely will be with the ven-
dee. Therefore, the vendor who does not have the equities clearly
on his side probably will not want to risk jury trial by filing an ac-
tion for ejectment. He would prefer to seek the nonjury equity of
redemption. It may be some time before the court will be able to
decide whether the tests applied to determine whether to grant the
equity of redemption to a vendee should be equally applicable in
an action for ejectment. 7 4
E. Specific Performance
Upon the purchaser's default, the vendor may bring a suit for
specific performance of the contract.175 The vendor must either
substantially perform or tender substantial performance of the
contract before he will be entitled to maintain an action for specific
performance or strict foreclosure. 7 6 To recover full payment from
the vendee at the time of default, the vendor must include an ac-
celeration clause in the contract. Because the contract calls only
for installment payments, without an acceleration clause the ven-
dor could sue only for amounts currently due and owing under the
contract. 77
creased in value so that strict foreclosure was inequitable. The supreme
court held that strict foreclosure was inappropriate because the property's
value exceeded the balance due on the contract. Id. at 320, 227 N.W.2d at 6.
172. 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 867 (1951).
173. Id. at 815, 49 N.W.2d at 689.
174. A commentator, after discussing Abbas, stated, "[t]hus it is apparent that the
equity of redemption as it is known in the law of mortgages does not exist in
the law of land contracts." Hancock, supra note 6, at 985. However, earlier
discussion of strict foreclosure clearly shows that the equity of redemption
does exist in land contracts and must be foreclosed. The Abbas decision
makes uncertain whether the equity of redemption can be ignored even if the
vendor is willing to comply with all the restrictions of bringing an action for
ejectment.
175. See, e.g., Kobza v. Spath, 166 Neb. 623, 90 N.W.2d 246 (1958); Miller v. Ruzicha,
111 Neb. 815, 198 N.W. 148 (1924).
176. See cases cited note 175 supra.
177. See Colson v. Johnson's Estate, 111 Neb. 773, 197 N.W. 674 (1924).
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F. Other Remedies
The availability of summary proceedings, notably forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, to recover possession from a vendee de-
faulting on a land contract may not be available in Nebraska. 178
The court in an 1887 case stated that the vendee had an interest in
the property which could be protected only in a court of equity. 7 9
No later Nebraska cases discuss this proposition.
VI. PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE VENDEE
Based upon the general premise that "equity abhors forfeit-
ures,"18 0 courts have avoided forfeitures on various theories.
These theories include: (1) granting the vendee the right to re-
quire the judicial foreclosure of the installment land contract; (2)
recognizing the vendee's equity of redemption; (3) allowing resti-
tution to the vendee of payments made in excess of the vendor's
damages; and (4) finding a vendor has waived strict performance
of the contract terms.
A. Right to Force a Judicial Sale
The availability of the right to force a judicial sale is often sup-
plemented by the right to restitution in order to protect the ven-
dee's established interest in the property.181 Courts have been
reluctant to decree judicial sale as a right available to the vendee
due to the expense and time delay caused the vendor and the
probability that the buyer's payments will not cover the
expense.182
Recently courts183 and commentators 84 have recognized the
178. Worthington v. Woods, 22 Neb. 230, 34 N.W. 368 (1887). See also Jones v.
Schmidt, 163 Neb. 508, 80 N.W.2d 289 (1957); Northwestern State Bank v.
Hanks, 118 Neb. 442, 225 N.W. 119 (1929).
179. Worthington v. Woods, 22 Neb. at 235, 34 N.W. at 371.
180. Adler v. Kohn, 96 Neb. 346, 351, 147 N.W. 1131, 1134 (1914).
181. See generally Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 559; Comment, supra note
38, at 104; Note, .upra note 35, at 201-05.
182. Comment, supra note 38, at 104.
183. See, e.g., H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226,301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
921 (1974); Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979). Contra, Glacier
Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc., 597 P.2d 689, 698 (Mont. 1979) ("contract for
deed and a purchase money mortgage are not one and the same thing with
two different names. They are two distinct legal creatures.")
184. As early as 1921, Professor Ballantine recognized the similarities and saw no
reason why the relief from forfeitures provided by the judicial foreclosure
statutes should be confined to mortgages:
The relation of the vendor and purchaser of land, under a wholly
executory contract, has been likened to the relation of mortgagor and
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similarities between installment land contracts and mortgages,
and some state courts have required installment land contract ven-
dors to proceed according to mortgage foreclosure statutes to
regain possession and full title to their property. 85 Other courts
have required judicial foreclosure methods only after it has been
determined that forfeiture would be inequitable.18 6
In Sebastian v. Floyd,187 the Kentucky Supreme Court found
the forfeiture clause in an installment land contract to be invalid
and required the installment contract vendor to bring judicial fore-
closure proceedings against the defaulting vendee. The vendee
had made a $3,900 down payment on a $10,900 house and lot and
had agreed to pay the balance plus the taxes, insurance, and inter-
est in monthly installments of $120. The forfeiture clause provided
that the vendor could terminate the contract and retain all pay-
ments previously made as rents and liquidated damages. During
the twenty-one months that the contract was in force, the vendee
paid a total of $5,480 rather than the $6,320 required by the con-
tract.188 The vendee had accumulated equity of $4,300 in the prop-
erty. Quoting cases from only two other jurisdictions,89 the court
nevertheless concluded that "[t]he modern trend is for courts to
treat land sale contracts as analogous to conventional mortgages,
thus requiring a seller to seek a judicial sale of the property upon
the buyer's default."190 While the court could have fashioned a
more restrictive rule relying on the value of the vendee's equitable
interest in relation to the vendor's interest, it chose to forbid the
operation of the forfeiture clause in all cases.191
mortgagee. The analogy is especially close when the buyer is given
possession and enjoyment of the land. The vendor's true remedy is
foreclosure, even where time is made of the essence. But the right to
relief from forfeiture is not dependent on the exactitude of this anal-
ogy, as there is no reason why such relief should be confined to
bonds and mortgages.
Ballantine, supra note 63, at 347. See, e.g., Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38;
Note, supra note 35; Comment, supra note 30.
185. See H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
186. See notes 192-200 & accompanying text infra.
187. 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979). The court explicitly overruled its previous deci-
sions in Kravitz v. Grimm, 273 Ky. 18, 115 S.W.2d 368 (1938) and Miles v. Prof-
fit, 266 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1954) to the extent those cases upheld the validity of a
forfeiture provision in an installment land contract. 585 S.W.2d at 384.
188. 585 S.W.2d at 384.
189. H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Skendzel v.
Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
190. 585 S.W.2d at 383.
191. The court felt that such a rule was the only way to ensure that the interests of
both buyer and seller were preserved. Under such a rule the seller recovers
the balance due on the contract plus expenses, while at the same time the
buyer's equity is protected. Id.
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The Sebastian court relied on Skendzel v. Marshal1192 to sup-
port its requirement of judicial foreclosure. The Skendzel court
equated mortgages and installment land contracts by its "piercing
of the transparent distinction between a land contract and a mort-
gage."' 93 Arguing that conceptually "the retention of the title by
the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage,"' 9 4 the
court stated that if one did not allow form to control substance, the
vendor-vendee relationship could be viewed as a mortgagee-mort-
gagor relationship.195 On the facts presented, if the court had en-
forced the forfeiture clause, the purchaser would have forfeited
$21,000. The court discussed equitable principles often cited in the
cases to avoid forfeiture,196 and concluded that the lien held by an
installment land contract vendor could be enforced through fore-
closure proceedings. While the case is cited for the rule that in-
stallment land contracts may be foreclosed only by judicial
foreclosure methods,197 the decision made clear that judicial fore-
closure procedures would not be required in every installment
land contract.19 8 The court suggested that forfeiture may still be
the appropriate remedy "[i]n the case of an abandoning, abscond-
ing vendee" or where the vendee has paid in a minimal amount
and thus has little or no equity in the property.199 Later Indiana
decisions clarify that Skendzel does not establish an absolute rule
requiring all installment land contracts to be foreclosed by judicial
192. 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
193. Id. at 234, 301 N.E.2d at 646.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. In reaching its decision, the Indiana Supreme Court began with the basic
premise applied by many other state courts, including Nebraska's:
"'[e]quity abhors forfeitures.'" Id. at 231, 301 N.E.2d at 644. Next it analyzed
the effect of enforcing the forfeiture clause and found that forfeiture was
"clearly excessive," id. at 232, 301 N.E.2d at 645, and would lead to uncon-
scionable results. Id. at 241, 301 N.E.2d at 650. It then took the step most
courts have not been willing to take and treated the installment land contract
as a mortgage: "The court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a
sale with a security interest in the form of a legal title reserved by the vendor.
Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as
reserving a lien or mortgage." Id. at 234, 301 N.E.2d at 646.
197. See Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky. 1979); Strausbaugh, supra
note 63, at 71.
198. "[F]orfeiture may only be appropriate under circumstances in which it is
found to be consonant with notions of fairness and justice under the law."
261 Ind. at 241, 301 N.E.2d at 650.
The court felt compelled to relieve the vendors who were left without a
remedy when the trial court correctly denied their request to obtain posses-
sion of the property through enforcement of a forfeiture clause. By denying
the vendors the relief they sought, they were denied all remedial relief.
199. 261 Ind. at 240-41, 301 N.E.2d at 650.
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sale.200 The Kentucky Supreme Court misplaced its reliance on
Skendzel to support its absolute rule and did not analyze the facts
in its case to determine whether any exception to Skendzel made
forfeiture without a sale more equitable.
In 1898,201 the Nebraska Supreme Court confronted a fact situa-
tion similar to Skendzel and arrived at a similar conclusion.202
However, the case, Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Thorn-
200. Miles Homes of Ind., Inc. v. Harrah Plumbing & Heating Serv. Co., - Ind.
App. -, 408 N.E.2d 597 (1980); U.S. Aircraft Financing, Inc. v. Jankovich, -
Ind. App. -, 407 N.E.2d 287 (1980); McLendon v. Safe Realty Corp., - Ind.
App. -, 401 N.E.2d 80 (1980), Hawkins v. Marion County Bd., - Ind. App. -,
394 N.E.2d 957 (1979); Donaldson v. Sellmar, 166 Ind. App. 60, 333 N.E.2d 862
(1975), overruled, Morris v. Weigle, - Ind. -, 383 N.E.2d 34 (1978); Tidd v.
Stauffer, 159 Ind. App. 570,308 N.E.2d 415 (1974); Goffv. Graham, 159 Ind. App.
324, 306 N.E.2d 758 (1974).
The analysis of these courts is much the same as the analysis of the Ne-
braska court in the strict foreclosure cases previously discussed. As one Indi-
ana court stated.
[W]e can find no reason why the Lees' interest cannot be forfeited
under the rule of Skendzel v. Marshall... which examines whether
a forefeiture would act as a penalty. Here the Lees have paid no prin-
cipal towards the contract, and owed more at the time of trial than
they did when the contract began.
Miles Homes of Ind., Inc. v. Harrah Plumbing & Heating Serv. Co., - Ind.
App. -, 408 N.E.2d at 600 (citations omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court
has rendered no decisions interpreting the rule in Skendzel.
201. Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Thornburg, 54 Neb. 782, 75 N.W. 45 (1898).
See also Hendrix v. Barker, 49 Neb. 369, 68 N.W. 531 (1896).
202. The court's discussion in Hendrix indicates its early recognition of the simi-
larities between installment land contracts and mortgages.
The vendor of land by an ordinary land contract holds the legal title
as security for the unpaid purchase money.'... 'We are not able to
draw any sensible distinction between the cases of a legal title con-
veyed to secure the payment of a debt and a legal title retained to
secure the payment of a debt. ... '
49 Neb. at 372, 68 N.W. at 532 (quoting Church v. Smith, 39 Wis. 492, 492
(1876)).
[I] n an executory contract for the sale of real estate, the vendor,
upon default made by the vendee, may treat the contract as an ordi-
nary real estate mortgage, and foreclose it as such.... 'A contract
for the sale of land conveys to the vendee an equitable title, and the
only principle upon which the vendor may sue for his money, and at
the same time seek security against the land, is the one which recog-
nizes the analogy to a vendor's lien in cases where the legal title has
been conveyed, and the vendee's title can only be divested by a sale.
The claim of a vendor in a land contract is but an ordinary money
debt secured by the contract, and his proceedings to enforce the lien
upon the land should be governed by the analogies of proceedings to
enforce other equitable liens and be executed by a sale to satisfy the
amount due.'
Id. at 372-73, 68 N.W. at 532 (quoting Fitzbaugh v. Maxwell, 34 Mich. 137, 138
(1876)).
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burg,20 3 has not been cited in subsequent cases to support applica-
tion of judicial foreclosure procedures to an installment land
contract. In Thornburg, the vendee defaulted after having paid
$560 on the $2,000 principal debt plus $162 interest.20 4 The contract
provided that time was of the essence and that default would work
a forfeiture of the vendee's rights. The vendor-assignee brought an
action for forfeiture which the court termed strict foreclosure, but
after considering the circumstances, the court determined that
there were insufficient grounds for a decree of forfeiture or for
strict foreclosure.205 The court reversed the trial court decree of
strict foreclosure and suggested that under the circumstances, it
would be proper for the vendor to request an ordinary foreclosure.
For the vendee with considerable equity in the property who is
forced to default and is unable to redeem, a judicial sale from
which it receives the proceeds in excess of the vendor's damages
or alternatively, restitution by the vendor, are the only remedies
that will avoid the vendee's forfeiture.
B. Vendee's Equity of Redemption
The purchaser may avoid the harsh effects of a contract provi-
sion for forfeiture by being given an opportunity to cure his de-
fault.206 "Some courts view this right, analogous to a mortgagor's
equity of redemption, as unconditional, while others are inclined
° to recognize it only if the purchaser's prior payments add up to a
substantial investment or 'equity' in the property."20 7 A court dis-
cussing equitable considerations in arriving at a decision as to
whether strict foreclosure is appropriate,208 usually will grant a
grace period to allow the vendee to reinstate the contract by
tendering full performance.209 Nebraska recognizes the vendee's
equity of redemption by granting the vendee who has defaulted on
his obligations an opportunity to make the payments and avoid the
203. 54 Neb. 782, 75 N.W. 45 (1898).
204. The contract price was $2,000 with a $200 down payment and monthly pay-
ments of $15 principal and $6 interest, or a total monthly payment of $21. De-
fault occurred after 24 monthly payments. Id at 786, 75 N.W. at 46.
205. The court noted the vendee's plea that his default was unintentional and that
he had been in default only a short time. The court did not seem to consider
that the property may have depreciated in value and that the vendee had not
paid the taxes nor kept the property properly insured. Id. at 786, 75 N.W. at
46.
206. Note, supra note 35, at 199-200.
207. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 33, at 550. See also G. GLENN, supra note 6,
§ 37.1.
208. See Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979).
209. "Where the buyer's equity is minimal, the grace period should be brief, but as
the equity increases so should the time for redemption." Comment, supra
note 38, at 103.
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consequences of default.210
Initially the Nebraska Supreme Court decided that the mort-
gage stay of execution did not apply to decrees of strict foreclo-
sure.211 However, a short time later the court decided to give the
party in default a reasonable time to avoid the bar of foreclosure
by performing his obligations under the contract.212 Since then the
court has allowed purchasers grace periods of varying lengths to
cure their defaults.213
Despite its apparent early recognition of the equity of redemp-
tion, the court has not been presented with cases which require it
to expressly define the parameters of that right. In the typical
case, the defaulting vendee tenders the balance of the purchase
price and sues the vendor for specific performance. 21 4 For exam-
ple, in Dowd Grain Co. v. Pflug,2 15 the vendee sued for specific per-
formance after the vendor declared the contract to be void because
the vendee's first installment was one week late. The contract pro-
vided for a $2,000 down payment with the balance to be paid in four
annual installments, and did not provide that time was of the es-
sence.216 The vendor contended that time was of the essence and
that the purchaser was guilty of a material breach thus justifying
rescission. To the court, neither the contract nor the parties' be-
210. See Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979), where the trial
court gave the defendants twenty days to pay the amount due or their equity
of redemption would be forever barred. The supreme court then decreed the
defendant's equity of redemption to be barred. Contra, Hancock, supra note
6, at 985, where the author states: "Thus it is apparent that the equity of re-
demption as it is known in the law of mortgages does not exist in the law of
land contracts." Hancock relied on Abbas v. Demont and Johnson v. Ruhl to
make this conclusion. As previously discussed, see notes 160-68 & accompa-
nying text supra, Abbas is an ejectment case. The court's denial of an equity
of redemption may depend on the cause of action filed.
The writer argues that Johnson v. Ruhl supports the contention that the
existence of an equity of redemption is determined by the seller and that the
buyer is relegated to the protections available under contract law. Reliance
on the Johnson case is inappropriate. The issue in that case had nothing to
do with an accounting or return of payments paid on the land contract, but
was instead an attempt by the vendee to receive damages for rents lost while
he was out of possession. Inappropriate pleading by the parties prevented
the court from addressing the equitable issues. See Johnson v. Ruhl, 162 Neb.
330, 75 N.W.2d 717 (1956).
211. Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 187-88, 56 N.W. 961, 964 (1893).
212. Patterson v. Mikkelson, 86 Neb. 512, 125 N.W. 1104 (1910) (reasonable time not
to exceed 90 days after the decree).
213. E.g., Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979) (20 days); Stroble
v. Smith, 131 Neb. 291, 267 N.W. 326 (1936) (30 days).
214. E.g., Nigh v. Hickman, 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. App. 1976).
215. 193 Neb. 483, 227 N.W.2d 610 (1975).
216. Id at 485, 227 N.W.2d at 611.
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havior indicated that time was of the essence.21 7 While the court
did not refer specifically to the vendee's equity of redemption, it
stated-
Specific performance should, in general, be granted, as a matter of course,
of a written contract cognizable in equity, which has been made in good
faith, whose terms are certain, whose provisions are fair, and which is ca-
pable of being enforced without hardship and when the ends of justice will
be served thereby.21
8
The court found that time was not of the essence and that the
breach was minor, and decreed specific performance. While there
was not an express recognition of the vendee's equity of redemp-
tion, the effect was the same, and the terms of the contract did not
strictly control the parties' rights.
The general rule in contract law is that specific performance
will not be granted when the party seeking it has failed to per-
form. 219 Courts have applied this rule strictly where the parties
expressly provide that time is of the essence220 or where it can be
made so by demand.221 This rule may make sense in the market-
ing contract context where both parties contemplate full perform-
ance on the closing date.222 However, because of possible
overriding equitable considerations, it does not make sense when a
continuing contractual agreement exists and the vendee merely is
late with his payments or for some reason discontinues payments
after a period of time of compliance with the contract.2m Some
courts have required a showing that the parties intended to create
an equitable mortgage before they will grant specific performance
to the vendee.224 The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, appar-
ently recognizes that, in substance, the installment land contract is
an equitable mortgage, and that equitable considerations should
determine whether a vendee is given the option to cure his
default.225
217. 1d. at 486, 227 N.W.2d at 611. The vendor had not performed his contractual
obligations to get an accurate legal description of the land, to place the war-
ranty deeds in escrow, and to remove a lien on the land. While the vendee's
first proffered installment was a week late and was less than the contract
called for, the vendee did pay the other installments in full and on time into
an escrow held by the district court. Id. at 484-86, 227 N.W.2d at 610-11.
218. Id at 486-87, 227 N.W.2d at 612.
219. See Neilson v. Leach, 140 Neb. 764, 1 N.W.2d 822 (1942).
220. See Menke v. Foote, 199 Neb. 800, 261 N.W.2d 635 (1978); Kear v. Hausman, 152
Neb. 512, 41 N.W.2d 850 (1950).
221. Foster v. Ley, 32 Neb. 404, 49 N.W. 450 (1891).
222. Klapka v. Shrauger, 135 Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938); Shonsey v. Clayton, 107
Neb. 695, 187 N.W. 113 (1922).
223. Nigh v. Hickman, 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. App. 1976).
224. See Barker v. Johnson, 591 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979).
225. See note 210 & accompanying text supra and notes 230-34 & accompanying
text infra.
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The court's recognition of the equity of redemption presents
significant problems of time and expense to the vendor who, by
signing the contract, anticipates being able to declare a forfeiture
upon the vendee's default, regain possession, and resell the prop-
erty. Even if a vendor is able to regain possession, in the absence
of a statute only a court order will cut off an equity of redemp-
tion.226 "In effect, this means that the vendor can be forced to liti-
gate-precisely the thing he hopes to avoid by use of the
installment contract."22 7 In the contract's early stages, requiring
the vendor to provide the vendee a redemption period adversely
affects the vendor's interests. However, in later contract stages,
the vendee's equity is considerable and should be acknowledged
by increasing his time for redemption.22 8 The Nebraska Supreme
Court has provided no guidance for determining what facts and cir-
cumstances will be considered in setting the length of the grace
period in which the vendee may exercise his equity of
redemption. 229
While the availability of the equity of redemption seems cer-
tain, its applicability is unclear. Patterson v. Mikkelson,230 cited as
support for the vendee's equity of redemption,2 3 1 did not involve a
vendee's suit for specific performance. In fact the court recognized
that the vendee refused to perform and was seeking merely to can-
cel the contract and recover the money paid. Nevertheless, the
court stated: "[T]he parties are in a court of equity, and we think
[the vendee] should be given an opportunity to make deferred
payments of principal and accrued interest."2 32 The court appar-
ently did not restrict the availability of the equity of redemption to
accidentally defaulting vendees.233 Thus, while the court seem-
ingly has expanded the equity of redemption's availability, the
vendee may find availability dependent on the type of action the
vendor files to enforce the contract.23
226. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 38, at 554.
227. Id.
228. Comment, supra note 38, at 103.
229. While the nine months allowed to a mortgagor seemingly would defeat the
vendor's interest in an expedient method for declaring default, the 20 days
allowed in Morgan v. Zoucha does not seem to be a "reasonable time to avoid
the bar of foreclosure."
230. 86 Neb. 512, 125 N.W. 1104 (1910).
231. Cases citing Patterson for this proposition include: Morgan v. Zoucha, 203
Neb. 119, 122,277 N.W.2d 564,566 (1979); Swanson v. Madson, 145 Neb. 815,821,
18 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1945).
232. 86 Neb. at 515, 125 N.W. at 1105.
233. Cf. Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957) (allowing
willfully defaulting vendee's equity of redemption).
234. See Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77,40 N.W.2d 265 (1949) (equity of redemption
denied in an action for ejectment).
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C. Restitution
The forfeiture provision in an installment land sale contract
contemplates denying the vendee a right to restitution upon his
default.235 "Not infrequently it has been thought sufficient reason
for denying restitution that the express terms of the contract made
time of the essence and provided that, in case of default, all instal-
ments paid should be 'forfeited' to the vendor or should be 're-
tained' by him as liquidated damages."236 This general rule
denying recovery of the payments made by the purchaser in de-
fault became firmly entrenched in marketing contracts to sell
land.23 7 The parties to such a contract are likely to have intended
the initial payments made by the vendee to represent liquidated
damages and not a penalty; therefore, it would not be inequitable
to deny restitution.238 "But when an installment contract is in-
volved, the general rule, denying the purchaser in default recovery
of payments made, operates to increase the penalty in inverse pro-
portion to the seriousness of the breach."23 9
235. The forfeiture concept is permissible as long as the strict contract approach
to installment land contracts is accepted. See Note, supra note 35, at 191.
If the vendor can forfeit the purchaser's payments, then obviously
the purchaser cannot recover them. But, by the weight of authority,
the purchaser in default cannot recover payments made, even
though the contract contains no forfeiture clause. Thus, the vendor's
right to retain the payments rests, not upon his right to forfeit them,
but upon the inability of the purchaser in default to recover therm.
Lee, supra note 4, at 1.
236. Corbin, supra note 63, at 1015.
237. Lee, supra note 4, at 2. The Nebraska Supreme Court denied restitution to a
defaulting purchaser in Lowry v. Robinson, 3 Neb. (Unoff.) 145, 91 N.W. 174
(1902), stating that according to the terms of the contract the parties did not
intend or understand that there would be a repayment. The court felt that
restitution ought to be refused for the good and sufficient reason that the pur-
chaser is the one guilty of a breach of contract and should never be allowed to
have an advantage from his own wrong.
238. Bando v. Cole, 197 Neb. 722, 250 N.W.2d 651 (1977); Patterson v. Murphy, 41
Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1 (1894). The vendee is entitled to rescission of the contract
and restitution of his payments where: (1) the vendor has made false or
fraudulent representations as to the title and quality of the land, Rushton v.
Campbell, 94 Neb. 141, 142 N.W. 902 (1913), contra, Russo v. Williams, 160 Neb.
564, 71 N.W.2d 131 (1955) (purchaser delayed in choosing to rescind, held not
entitled to rescission); (2) the vendor is unable to perform his obligations
under the contract, Klapka v. Shrauger, 135 Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 148 (1938);
Miller v. Ruzicha, 111 Neb. 815, 198 N.W. 148 (1924); Dent v. Johnson, 111 Neb.
162, 195 N.W. 938 (1923); or (3) the vendor's questionable conduct has pre-
vented him from performing, Durland Trust Co. v. Augustyn, 110 Neb. 800,195
N.W. 172 (1923).
239. Lee, supra note 4, at 1-2. If the vendee contracts to purchase property for a
contract price of $10,000 with $1,000 down and $1,000 a year for nine years and
if he defaults in the first year, the vendor keeps the $1,000 and the property.
This result is not hard to accept. However, if the vendee pays faithfully for
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has decided that where the ven-
dor rescinds the contract after the vendee's default,240 the vendee's
entitlement to restitution depends upon whether the parties' con-
tract provides for forfeiture upon default. In Eaton v. Redick,241
the court held that the vendee's failure to perform his obligations
under a contract with no forfeiture clause did not terminate the
contract, but gave the vendor the option to adhere to or rescind the
contract. The purchasers had made a down payment and had exe-
cuted notes for the balance but failed to satisfy the notes. The
seller, by deciding to sell the property to another person, in effect
exercised the rescission option.2 42 The court held that the vendee
should be allowed to recover the amount by which his payment
exceeded the vendor's damages.243
This result was criticized in Patterson v. Murphy244 and Maloy
v. Muir.245 In both cases, unlike Eaton, the contracts contained
forfeiture clauses. The court in both cases stated that the vendee,
by defaulting, had forfeited his rights under the contract and there-
fore was not entitled to rescission. 24 6 However, Maloy is distin-
guishable from Eaton because the vendor had not sold the
property and put it out of his power to perform the contract if the
vendees made the payment.247 As long as the vendor can perform
eight years and then is late with the ninth and last payment, the vendor has
$9,000 and regains the property which is now most likely worth more than
$10,000, while the vendee has lost his $9,000 in payments and has only the use
of the property for eight years to show for his investment.
240. If the vendor breaches the contract the vendee may use different causes of
action to obtain the return of his payments, e.g., breach of contract,
restitution.
241. 1 Neb. 305 (1871).
242. Id. at 308.
243. Id. "When vendor elects to put an end to the contract vendee may recover
back the money he paid in part performance with interest from the date of
rescission." Id. at 308-09.
244. 41 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1 (1894).
245. 62 Neb. 80, 86 N.W. 916 (1901).
246. 41 Neb. at 821, 60 N.W. at 2; 62 Neb. at 83, 86 N.W. at 917.
247. Maloy v. Muir, 62 Neb. 80, 83, 86 N.W. 916, 917 (1901); Eaton v. Redick, 1 Neb.
305, 306 (1871). Hancock said that the rule set out in Eaton has never been
followed. He stated that the rule adopted in Maloy was "that a buyer in de-
fault cannot recover his payments from a seller who has rescinded." Han-
cock, supra note 6, at 986. While the Maloy court seemingly adopted
Patterson v. Murphy (that vendee was not entitled to restitution after forfei-
ture) in rejecting the Eaton rule, the facts in Maloy were not the same as
those in Eaton. In Eaton, the vendor by selling the property to someone else
had terminated the contract. The vendor in Maloy, however, still could have
performed and the vendee was granted a grace period of 20 days to tender his
payment.
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the contract the vendee has no right to restitution.248
In Pester v. Dean,249 the court made it clear that Eaton was still
good law. The Pester decision discussed the treatment of restitu-
tion in the previous cases and concluded that "the decisive point
seems to be whether or not the agreement provided for a forfeiture
of the advance payment in default of subsequent payments by the
purchaser."250
No Nebraska case since 1936, when Pester was decided, has in-
terpreted these cases to decide whether restitution is allowable.
From these cases it appears that if a forfeiture clause is present,
the vendor is not entitled to restitution. This rule is understanda-
ble in the marketing contract context as long as the amount denied
is reasonable liquidated damages. 25 1 The problem comes in in-
stallment land contracts where the vendee has paid a substantial
amount before he defaults. If the vendor then sells to a third party
and receives more than the amount the vendee owed, it is inequita-
ble to permit him to keep the vendee's payments,252 unless the
payments were equal to the fair rental value of the property during
the vendee's time of possession.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Morgan v. Zoucha253 consid-
ered whether it would be equitable to allow restitution upon the
vendee's request. The amount the vendee wanted returned was
eleven percent of the contract and the court noted that "the con-
tract clearly provides for its forfeiture in the event of default."254
However, the court then noted that the amount being forfeited
compared favorably with the rental value.255 Once the court has
determined that forfeiture would be inequitable, restitution is one
way to satisfy the parties' interests. The defaulting vendee should
be required to show that the amount being retained exceeds the
248. As long as the vendor continues to assert [his right to specific per-
formance and his right as holder of a lien for the purchase price] and
to remain ready and willing to make conveyance as agreed, the de-
faulting vendee has no right of restitution; he cannot recover back
money that he has paid if it is money that the vendor could still com-
pel him to pay if as yet unpaid.
Corbin, supra note 63, at 1018.
249. 131 Neb. 800, 270 N.W. 112 (1936).
250. Id. at 807, 270 N.W. at 116.
251. DOBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.14 (1973).
252. Id.
253. 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564 (1979).
254. Id. at 123, 277 N.W.2d at 566.
255. Id The court considered rental value as well as repair expenses paid by the
vendee. It can only be assumed that the court's analysis would consider the
same factors if the money paid by the vendee and the repair expenses were
greater than the benefit derived from possession of the property. It is as-
sumed that if the equities cut the other way the court would have granted
restitution.
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vendor's damage and thus is unreasonable because it constitutes a
windfall to the vendor and a penalty to the vendee.256 As one com-
mentator statedz
Whether the vendor has 'rescinded' for the vendee's breach or not, and
whether there is an express provision for forfeiture or not, it is clear that
the vendee in default should in no case be given restitution of money paid
unless it affirmatively appears that the money so paid is in excess of the
injury caused to the vendor by the breach. The vendee sues because he
asserts that the retention of the money is unjust enrichment but there is
no injustice if the defendant is retaining no more than the amount of in-
jury caused by the plaintiff's breach. In cases where the plaintiff may
have a right of restitution, he should be permitted to show that the defend-
ant's injury is less than the installments paid- but unless he successfully
shows this, he should recover nothing.257
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether to allow restitution to the willfully defaulting vendee,258
but the modern approach ignores the defaulter's moral turpitude
and instead determines the equities of the situation.25 9 Because
the Nebraska court has recognized the vendee's equity of redemp-
tion, it should deny restitution only if one or more of the following
grounds exists:
(1) The defendant [vendor] has not rescinded and remains ready and
willing to perform, and still has a right to specific performance by the.
vendee;
(2) the plaintiff [vendee] has not shown that the injury caused by his
breach is less than the instalments received by the defendant
(3) there is an express provision that the money may be retained by the
vendor and the facts are such as to make this a genuine provision for
liquidated damages, and not one for a penalty or forfeiture. 260
D. Waiver
The court is now willing to apply equitable considerations to
avoid strict foreclosure when the equities favor the vendee.26 1
Thus, even when the court regards the contract as strictly gov-
erning the parties' rights it will try to avoid forfeiture by finding
that the vendor has waived performance.262 This enables the. court
256. See Note, 35 BROOKLYN L. REv., supra note 63, at 87 (citing RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRAcTS § 357, comment (d) (1932)).
257. Corbin, supra note 63, at 1023.
258. Cf. Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Cal.
2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951) (allowing restitution to willfully defaulting vendee).
California has gone the furthest of any state in upholding the right of the
willfully defaulting vendee to receive restitution.
259. McGovern, Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and the Availability
of Credit. An Historical Perspective, 74 Nw. L REv. 141, 164 (1979).
260. Corbin, supra note 63, at 1032-33.
261. See notes 103-37 & accompanying text supra.
262. See Walker v. Burtless, 82 Neb. 211, 117 N.W. 349, vacated, 82 Neb. 214,216, 117
N.W. 349 (1908).
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to affirm the parties' contract and yet, by finding that the vendor
did not perform according to the forfeiture provision, to protect the
vendee where enforcement of the forfeiture provision would be
inequitable.
The situations which may be deemed a waiver vary. For exam-
ple, the court may refuse to enforce the forfeiture clause because
the vendor has not declared the forfeiture.263 If the vendor is late
with an aspect of his performance, such as providing a marketable
title, he will be found to have waived the vendee's performance. 26 4
Waiver of performance under "the time is of the essence"
clause typically occurs when a vendor has allowed the vendee to
make his payment late. The vendor then is deemed to have waived
strict performance under the clause in the future.265 The "time is
of the essence" clause can be reinstated with timely "notice to the
vendee of the intent to insist on punctuality and allowing a reason-
able time for performance." 266
VII. CONCLUSION
The lack of case law on the issues involved in providing reme-
dies upon breach of installment land contracts causes uncertainty
in this area of Nebraska law. Although many of the principles have
been long established, the lack of litigated cases has contributed to
the lack of clarity in the application of these principles. Generally
the Nebraska Supreme Court has not allowed the forfeiture clause
to operate unjustly against the legitimate interests of the vendee.
The court has established three criteria in deciding strict foreclo-
sure cases. Thus, if the property's fair market value is greater than
the contract price, if the payments the vendee forfeits are greater
than the fair rental value of the property, or if the vendee has es-
tablished significant equity in the land, the court will not decree
strict foreclosure of the contract. The vendor will be forced instead
to find an alternate remedy which may require judicially foreclos-
ing the contract or providing restitution to the vendee. The exact
parameters of the alternate remedies have not been decided.
Currently it is uncertain whether the vendor can determine, by
his choice of remedy, whether the above criteria will be applied to
263. Id. Time was not of the essence and the vendor never declared the money
forfeited. By the terms of the agreement a forfeiture was to be declared. The
court held that the forfeiture clause must be construed strictly against the
vendor and that she was not entitled to retain the money.
264. Neilson v. Leach, 140 Neb. 764, 1 N.W.2d 822 (1942); Miller v. Ruzicha, 111 Neb.
815, 198 N.W. 148 (1924); Adler v. Kohn, 96 Neb. 346, 147 N.W. 1131 (1914);
Rushton v. Campbell, 94 Neb. 141, 142 N.W. 902 (1913).
265. Peckham v. Deans, 186 Neb. 190, 181 N.W.2d 851 (1970).
266. Hines, supra note 11, at 490.
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a remedy other than strict foreclosure. Apparently if the vendor
brings an equitable action the court will engage in the equitable
analysis.
Typical installment land contract terms contemplate that the
vendor will be restored to possession and retain the payments of
the vendee upon the vendee's default. Upon a challenge by the
vendee, the courts have provided relief from the harsh effects of
the enforcement of the forfeiture provision by the equity of re-
demption, right to restitution, and right to require a judicial sale.
Despite these rights, the installment land contract has continued
to be an attractive financing device for vendors because vendees
have not asserted their rights. As vendees begin to assert their
rights more frequently or legislatures decide to require judicial
sales to foreclose the rights, as in the mortgage context, vendors
will abandon this financing device.
The Nebraska Supreme Court currently treats installment land
contracts as security devices different from mortgages and at-
tempts to fashion equitable solutions upon default. While requir-
ing judicial foreclosure may provide the most equitable remedy, it
should not be applied in every default. Installment land contracts
should not be equated with mortgages or vendors will be even less
willing than they are now to take the risks inherent in this financ-
ing device. However, if the courts can balance the interests of both
the vendor and vendee by protecting the vendor's interest early in
the contract period and the vendee's interest after he has made a
significant investment in the property, the installment land con-
tract can continue as a financing option.
Pamela M. Hastings '81
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